Turing jumps through provability by Joosten, Joost J.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
1.
05
32
7v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  2
1 J
an
 20
15
Turing jumps through provability
Joost J. Joosten∗
University of Barcelona
October 3, 2018
Abstract
Fixing some computably enumerable theory T , the Friedman-Goldfarb-
Harrington (FGH) theorem says that over elementary arithmetic, each Σ1
formula is equivalent to some formula of the form Tϕ provided that T
is consistent. In this paper we give various generalizations of the FGH
theorem. In particular, for n > 1 we relate Σn formulas to provability
statements [n]TrueT ϕ which are a formalization of “provable in T together
with all true Σn+1 sentences”. As a corollary we conclude that each [n]
True
T
is Σn+1-complete.
This observation yields us to consider a recursively defined hierarchy
of provability predicates [n + 1]T which look a lot like [n + 1]
True
T except
that where [n + 1]TrueT calls upon the oracle of all true Σn+2 sentences,
the [n + 1]T recursively calls upon the oracle of all true sentences of the
form 〈n〉Tφ. As such we obtain a ‘syntax-light’ characterization of Σn+1
definability whence of Turing jumps which is readily extended beyond
the finite. Moreover, we observe that the corresponding provability pred-
icates [n + 1]T are well behaved in that together they provide a sound
interpretation of the polymodal provability logic GLPω.
1 Introduction
In first order arithmetic we have natural syntactical definitions that correspond
to finite iterations of the Turing jump. Recall that a sentence in first order
logic in the standard language of arithmetic is Σn+1 if it starts with a block of
alternating quantifiers of length n + 1 where the leftmost quantifier is existen-
tial and where the block of quantifiers is followed by a decidable formula only
containing bounded quantification. There are various results known that relate
these formula classes to computational complexity classes.
For example, a set of natural numbers is many-one reducible to the n-th
Turing jump of the empty set if and only if it is Σn definable (on the standard
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model of the natural numbers). Likewise, a set of natural numbers is Turing-
reducible to the n-th Turing jump of the empty set if and only if it and its
complement can be defined on the standard model of the natural numbers by
a Σn+1 formula. Similarly, a set of natural numbers is computably enumerable
relative to the n-th Turing jump of the empty set if and only if it can be defined
by a Σn+1 formula.
In this paper we shall use the fact that various provability predicates are
Turing complete in a certain sense so that we can give alternative characteri-
zations for the finite Turing jumps. A central ingredient in proving our results
come from generalizations of the so-called FGH Theorem.
The FGH Theorem (for Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington) tells us that for any
c.e. theory T we have provably in Elementary Arithmetic that each Σ1 sentence
σ is equivalent to a provability statement of T , provided T is consistent. In
symbols,
∀σ∈Σ1 ∃ψ EA ⊢ ♦T⊤ →
(
σ ↔ Tψ
)
.
Here, as usual T denotes a natural formalization of provability in T and the
♦T stands for the dual consistency assertion. In this paper we give various
generalizations of the FGH theorem. In particular we prove that the theorem
holds for the provability notion [n]T : provable in T together with all true Σn+1
formulas. As a corollary we conclude that each [n]TrueT is Σn+1-complete.
This observation yields us to consider a recursively defined hierarchy of prov-
ability predicates [n + 1]T which look a lot like [n + 1]
True
T except that where
[n+1]TrueT calls upon the oracle of all true Σn+2 sentences, the [n+1]

T recursively
calls upon the oracle of all true sentences of the form 〈n〉T φ.
As such we obtain a ‘syntax-light’ characterization of Σn+1 definability
whence of Turing jumps which is readily extended beyond the finite. More-
over, we observe that the corresponding provability predicates [n+1]T are well
behaved in that together they provide a sound interpretation of the polymodal
provability logic GLPω.
2 Preliminaries
We shall work with theories with identity in the language {0, 1, exp,+, ·, <} of
arithmetic where exp denotes the unary function x 7→ 2x. We define ∆0 =
Σ0 = Π0 formulas as those where all quantifiers occur bounded, that is, we
only allow quantifiers of the form ∀x<t or ∃x<t where t is some term not
containing x. We inductively define Σn,Πn ⊂ Πn+1 and Σn,Πn ⊂ Σn+1; if
φ, ψ ∈ Πn+1, then ∀x φ, φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ ∈ Πn+1 and likewise, if φ, ψ ∈ Σn+1, then
∃x φ, φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ ∈ Σn+1.
We shall write Σn+1! for formulas ϕ of the form ∃x ϕ0 with ϕ0 ∈ Πn. We
will work in the absence of strong versions of (bounded) collection Bϕ which is
defined as
Bϕ := ∀z ∀~u
(
∀x<z ∃y ϕ(x, y, ~u)→ ∃y′ ∀x<z ∃ y<y′ ϕ(x, y, ~u)
)
.
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Therefore, we will consider the formula class Σn+1,1 consisting of existentially
quantified disjunctions and conjunctions of Σn+1 formulas with bounded quan-
tifiers over them. To be more precise, we first inductively define
Σn+1,b := Σn+1 | (Σn+1,b ◦ Σn+1,b) | (Q x<y Σn+1,b)
with ◦ ∈ {∧,∨} and Q ∈ {∀, ∃}. Next we define the Σn+1,1 formulas to be of
the form ∃x φ with φ ∈ Σn+1,b.
The theory of elementary arithmetic, EA, is axiomatized by the defining
axioms for {0, 1, exp,+, ·, <} together with induction for all ∆0 formulas. The
theory Peano Arithmetic, PA, is as EA but now allowing induction axioms for
any first order formula.
It is well known that PA proves any instance Bϕ of collection so that in
particular each Σn+1,1 sentence is equivalent to some Σn+1 sentence. Clearly
we have that Σn+1! ⊂ Σn+1. Using coding techniques, it is clear that each Σn+1
formula is within EA equivalent to a Σn+1! formula.
For us, a computably enumerable (c.e.) theory T is understood to be given
by a ∆0 formula that defines the set of codes of the primitive recursive set of
axioms of T . We will employ standard formalizations of meta-mathematical
properties like ProofT (x, y) for “x is the Go¨del number of a proof from the
axioms of T of the formula whose Go¨del number is y”. We shall often refrain
from distinguishing a syntactical object ϕ from its Go¨del number pϕq or from
a syntactical representation of its Go¨del number.
We will write Tϕ for the Σ1! formula ∃x ProofT (x, ϕ) and ♦Tϕ for ¬T¬ϕ.
By Tϕ(x˙) we will denote a formula which contains the free variable x, that
expresses that for each value of x the formula ϕ(x) is provable in T . Here, x
denotes a syntactical representation of the number x.
By Σ1 completeness we refer to the fact that for any true Σ1 sentence σ we
have that EA ⊢ σ. It is well-known that EA proves a formalized version of this:
for any Σ1 formula σ(x) and any c.e. theory T we have EA ⊢ σ(x)→ Tσ(x˙).
3 The FGH theorem and generalizations
In this section we shall be dealing with various so-called witness-comparison
arguments where the order of (least) witnesses to existential sentences is im-
portant. The first and most emblematic such argument occurred in the proof
of Rosser’s theorem which is a strengthening of Go¨del’s first incompleteness
theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Rosser’s Theorem). Let T be a consistent c.e. theory extending
EA. There is some ρ ∈ Σ1 which is undecidable in T . That is,
T 0 ρ and,
T 0 ¬ρ.
For rhetoric reasons we shall below include a standard proof of this celebrated
result. Before doing so, we first need some notation.
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Definition 3.2. For φ := ∃x φ0(x) and ψ := ∃x ψ0(x) we define
φ ≤ ψ := ∃x
(
φ0(x) ∧ ∀ y<x0¬ψ0(y)
)
and,
φ < ψ := ∃x
(
φ0(x) ∧ ∀ y≤x ¬ψ0(x)
)
.
Statements of the form φ ≤ ψ or φ < ψ with φ, ψ ∈ Σn+1 are called witness-
comparison statements. Let us now collect some easy principles about witness-
comparison statements whose elementary proofs we leave as an exercise.
Lemma 3.3. For A and B in Σn+1 we have
1. EA ⊢ (A < B)→ (A ≤ B);
2. EA ⊢ (A < B) ∧ (B ≤ C)→ (A < C);
3. EA ⊢ (A ≤ B) ∧ (B < C)→ (A < C);
4. EA ⊢ (A ≤ B) ∧ (B ≤ C)→ (A ≤ C);
5. EA ⊢ (A ≤ B)→ ¬(B < A) and consequently;
6. EA ⊢ (A < B)→ ¬(B ≤ A);
7. EA ⊢ [(B ≤ B) ∨ (A ≤ A)] → [(A ≤ B) ∨ (B < A)];
8. EA ⊢ (A ≤ B)→ A;
9. EA ⊢ A ∧ ¬B → (A < B) ;
10. EA ⊢ A ∧ ¬(A ≤ B)→ B.
11. Both C < D and C ≤ D are of complexity Σn+1,1 if C,D∈Σn+1,1.
We can now present a concise proof of Rosser’s theorem.
Proof. We consider a fixpoint ρ so that T ⊢ ρ↔ (T¬ρ ≤ Tρ).
If T ⊢ ρ, then for some number n we have ProofT (n, ρ). Since T is consistent
we also have ∀m≤n¬ProofT (m,¬ρ). Thus, by Σ1 completeness we have T ⊢
Tρ < T¬ρ whence T ⊢ ¬ρ; a contradiction.
Likewise, if T ⊢ ¬ρ we may conclude T¬ρ ≤ Tρ so that T ⊢ ρ.
We would like to stress that it is actually quite remarkable that witness
comparison arguments on statements involving Go¨del numbering can be used
to yield any sensible information at all, since by tweaking the Go¨del numbering
in a primitive recursive fashion we can always flip the order of the codes of
any two syntactical objects. Of course, as we use fixpoints, after tweaking
the Go¨del numbering, the corresponding fixpoint also changes. But still, it
is remarkable that the useful witness comparison information of the fixpoint
cannot be destroyed by tweaking the underlying Go¨del numbering.
We now turn our attention to another theorem, a proof of which can suc-
cinctly be given using witness comparison arguments: the FGH theorem. The
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initials FGH refer to Friedman, Goldfarb and Harrington who all substantially
contributed to the theorem and we refer to [6] for historical details.
Basically, the FGH theorem says that given any c.e. theory T , any Σ1 sen-
tence is provably equivalent to a provability statement of the form Tϕ, modulo
the consistency of T . The proof we give here is a slight modification of the one
presented in [6]. The most important improvement is that we avoid the use of
the least-number principle so that the proof becomes amenable for generaliza-
tions without a need to increase the strength of the base theory.
Theorem 3.4 (FGH theorem). Let T be any computably enumerable theory
extending EA. For each σ ∈ Σ1 we have that there is some ρ ∈ Σ1 so that
EA ⊢ ♦T⊤ →
(
σ ↔ Tρ
)
.
Proof. As in [6] we consider the fixpoint ρ ∈ Σ1 for which EA ⊢ ρ ↔ (σ ≤ Tρ).
Without loss of generality we may assume that σ ∈ Σ1! so that both σ ≤ Tρ
and Tρ < σ are Σ1. We now reason in EA, assume ♦T⊤ and set out to prove
σ ↔ Tρ.
(→): assume for a contradiction that σ and ¬T ρ. By Lemma 3.3.9 we
conclude σ ≤ Tρ, i.e., ρ. By provable Σ1 completeness we get Tρ.
(←): assume for a contradiction that ¬σ and Tρ. Again, we conclude
Tρ < σ so that T (T ρ < σ) whence T¬ρ so that T⊥ contradicting the
assumption ♦T⊤.
A very special feature of ρ from the above proof is that it is of complexity
Σ1 and that ¬ρ is implied a by a related Σ1 formula. Thus, we clearly provably
have ρ → Tρ but in general we do not have ¬ρ → T¬ρ. But, due to the
nature of ρ we have that T¬ρ follows from the Σ1 statement that is slightly
stronger than ¬ρ, namely Tρ < σ: since provably (Tρ < σ)→ T (Tρ < σ)
and
(Tρ < σ) → ¬(σ ≤ Tρ)
→ ¬ρ.
The least number principle for Σn formulas, LΣn, says that for any ψ ∈ Σn we
have ∃xψ(x)→ ∃x (ψ(x) ∧ ∀ y<x ¬ψ(y)). Of course, using LΣ0 and by Lemma
3.3.7, ¬ρ and ρ < σ are provably equivalent under the assumption that ρ∨σ.
We will be interested in generalizing the FGH theorem to Σn formulas using
ever stronger notions of provability. Visser’s proof of the FGH theorem as
presented in [6] used an application of the least number principle for ∆0 formulas
in the guise of A→ (A ≤ A). Thus, a direct generalization of Visser’s argument
to stronger provability notions would call for stronger and stronger arithmetical
principles:
Lemma 3.5. The schema A → (A ≤ A) for A ∈ Σn+1! is over EA provably
equivalent to the least-number principle for Πn formulas.
However, since our proof of the FGH theorem did not use the minimal num-
ber principle, we shall now see how the above argument generalizes to other
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provability predicates. By [n + 1]TrueT we will denote the formalization of the
predicate “provable in T together with all true Σn+2 sentences”. For conve-
nience, we set [0]T := T . Basically, for n > 0, the predicate [n]
True
T ϕ will be
a formalization of “there is a sequence π0, . . . , πm so that each πi is either an
axiom of T , or a true Σn+1 sentence, or a propositional logical tautology, or
a consequence of some rule of T using earlier elements in the sequence as an-
tecedents”. Thus, it is clear that for recursive theories T we can write [n]TrueT
by a Σn+1,1-formula. Also, we have provable Σn+1,1 completeness for these
predicates, that is:
Lemma 3.6. Let T be a c.e. theory extending EA and let φ be a Σn+1,1 formula.
We have that
EA ⊢ φ(x)→ [n]TrueT φ(x˙).
Proof. Given φ(z, y1, . . . , yk, x) ∈ Σn+1, reason in EA, fix x1, . . . , xk, x and,
assume
∃zQ1 y1<x1 . . .Qk yk<xk φ(z, y1, . . . , yk, x)
where Q1 y1<x1 . . .Qk yk<xk is some block of bounded quantifiers. Thus, for
some a we have Q1 y1<x1 . . .Qk yk<xk φ(a, y1, . . . , yk, x). Under the box, we
can now replace each ∀ yi<xi by
∧
yi<xi
and each ∃ yi<xi by
∨
yi<xi
so that
by applying distributivity we see that Q1 y1<x1 . . .Qk yk<xk φ(a, y1, . . . , yk, x)
is equivalent to a disjunctive normal form of bounded substitution instances of
φ(a, y1, . . . , yk, x). Note that this operation in available within EA since it only
requires the totality of exponentiation.
Outside the box we know that for some of these big conjunctions of bounded
substitution instances of φ(a, y1, . . . , yk, x) actually all of the conjuncts are true.
Since each of those conjuncts is a true Σn+1 sentence, each conjunct is an axiom
whence holds under the box. Thus, the whole conjunct is provable under the
box whereby we obtain [n]TrueT Q1 y1<x1 . . .Qk yk<xk φ(a, y1, . . . , yk, x) whence
[n]TrueT ∃zQ1 y1<x1 . . .Qk yk<xk φ(z, y1, . . . , yk, x) as was to be shown. It is clear
that this case suffices for the more general form of Σn+1,1 formulas.
It is easy to check that the predicate [n]TrueT is well behaved. In particular one
can check that all the axioms of the standard provability logic GL as defined
in the last section hold for it. Over EA, the notion of [n]TrueT can be related to
regular provability T by the lemma below.
By FinSeq(f) we denote a predicate that only holds on numbers that are
codes of a finite sequence of Go¨del numbers and by |f | we denote the length of
such a sequence. Moreover, fi will denote the ith element of such a sequence f .
With TrueΣn+1 we will denote a partial truth predicate for Σn+1 formulas and
TrΣn+1 will denote the set of true Σn+1 sentences.
Lemma 3.7. For any c.e. theory T , we have that
EA ⊢ [n]TrueT ϕ↔ ∃f
(
FinSeq(f)∧∀ i<|f | TrueΣn+1(fi) ∧ T
(
(∧i<|f |fi)→ ϕ
))
.
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Proof. We reason in EA fixing some ϕ. The ← direction follows directly from
the formalized deduction theorem. For the other direction fix some p with
ProofT+TrΣn+1 (p, ϕ). We can express that pi is a true Σn+1 sentence in a ∆0
fashion simply by saying that it is not a propositional tautology, nor an axiom
of T , nor the result of applying a rule to earlier elements in the sequence. Thus,
by ∆0 induction on the length of p we can prove that there is a sequence that
collects all the true Σn+1 sentences.
Note that our definition of [n]TrueT is slightly non-standard since in the lit-
erature (e.g. [1]) it is more common to define [n]TrueT using a Πn oracle rather
than a Σn+1 oracle. With a Πn oracle one gets provable Σn+1 completeness but
in the absence of BΣn+1 not necessarily provable Σn+1,1 completeness. With
our definition of [n]TrueT , since A ≤ B ∈ Σn+1,1 for A,B ∈ Σn+1,1, and since
we provided a proof where the minimal number principle is avoided, the FGH
theorem smoothly generalizes to the new setting.
Theorem 3.8. Let T be any computably enumerable theory extending EA and
let n < ω. For each σ ∈ Σn+1,1 we have that there is some ρn ∈ Σn+1,1 so that
EA ⊢ 〈n〉TrueT ⊤ →
(
σ ↔ [n]TrueT ρn
)
.
Proof. The proof runs entirely analogue to the proof of Theorem 3.4. Thus, for
each number n we consider the fixpoint ρn so that EA ⊢ ρn ↔ (σ ≤ [n]TrueT ρn).
Note that both ρn and [n]
True
T ρ < σ are Σn+1,1 whence by Lemma 3.6 we can
apply provable Σn+1,1 completeness to them.
As an easy corollary we get that [n]TrueT formulas are closed not only under
conjunction, as is well know, but also under disjunctions. Note that the FGH
theorem yields that provably 〈n〉TrueT ⊤ → (σ ↔ [n]
True
T ρn). Using the proposi-
tional tautology
(¬A→ C)→
[(
A→ (B ↔ C)
)
↔
(
(¬A ∨B)↔ C
)]
and [n]TrueT ⊥ → [n]
True
T ρn we see that this is equivalent to
(
[n]TrueT ⊥ ∨ σ
)
↔
[n]TrueT ρn.
Corollary 3.9. Let T be a c.e. theory extending EA and let n ∈ N. For each
formulas ϕ, ψ there is some σ ∈ Σn+1 so that
T ⊢ ([n]TrueT ϕ ∨ [n]
True
T ψ) ↔ [n]
True
T σ.
Proof. We consider some σ ∈ Σn+1,1 so that provably σ ↔ ([n]TrueT ϕ ∨ [n]
True
T ψ).
By Theorem 3.8 applied to this σ we provably have that ([n]TrueT ϕ ∨ [n]
True
T ψ) ∨
[n]TrueT ⊥ is equivalent to [n]
True
T ϕ ∨ [n]
True
T ψ.
As another corollary of Theorem 3.8 we see that, in a sense, the notion of
n-provability is Σn+1 complete. To establish this, we will first need a particular
version of the fixpoint lemma.
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Lemma 3.10. Let ψ(x, y) be a formula whose free variables are amongst {x, y}.
There is a formula ϕ(y) so that
EA ⊢ ϕ(y)↔ ψ(pϕ(y˙)q, y).
Proof. The lemma easily follows from the well-known version of the fixpoint
lemma by which for each formula ψ(x, y) there is a formula ϕ(y) so that
EA ⊢ ϕ(y)↔ ψ(pϕ(y)q, y) (1)
(e.g., the generalized diagonal lemma from Boolos’ [2], Chapter 3).
By z = sub(u, v, w) we denote the formula that expresses that z is the Go¨del
number of the result of substituting the numeral of w for the variable whose
Go¨del number is v into the formula whose Go¨del number is u. By ψ(x/z, y) we
denote the result of substituting z for x in ψ(x, y). We now consider the formula
∃z
(
z = sub(x, pyq, y) ∧ ψ(x/z, y)
)
and apply Equation (1) to it to obtain the required fixpoint. Note that
EA ⊢
[
∃z
(
z = sub(pϕ(y)q, pyq, y) ∧ ψ(x/z, y)
)]
←→ ψ(pϕ(y˙)q, y).
With this lemma we can now prove Σn+1-completeness of the [n]
True
T prov-
ability predicate.
Lemma 3.11. Let T be any sound c.e. theory and let A ⊆ N. The following
are equivalent
1. A is c.e. in ∅(n);
2. A is many-one reducible to ∅(n+1);
3. A is definable on the standard model by a Σn+1 formula;
4. A is definable on the standard model by a formula of the form [n]TrueT ρ(x˙);
5. A is definable on the standard model by a formula of the form [n]TrueT ρ(x˙)
where ρ(x) ∈ Σn+1,1;
Proof. The equivalence of 1, 2, and 3 is just Post’s theorem.
The implication 5 ⇒ 4 is trivial, and implication 4 ⇒ 3 holds in virtue of
[n]TrueT being a Σn+1,1 predicate which on N is equivalent to some Σn+1 formula,
so it suffices to prove 3 ⇒ 5.
Thus, let the number n be fixed and, let A be a set of natural numbers so
that for some σ(x) ∈ Σn+1 we have m ∈ A ⇐⇒ N |= σ(m). Using lemma 3.10
we find ρn(x) ∈ Σn+1,1 so that
EA ⊢ ∀x
(
ρn(x) ↔ [σ(x) ≤ [n]
True
T ρn(x˙)]
)
.
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Reasoning in EA, we pick an arbitrary x and repeat the reasoning as in the
proof of Theorem 3.8 to see that
EA ⊢ 〈n〉TrueT ⊤ → ∀x
(
σ(x) ↔
(
[n]TrueT ρn(x˙)
) )
.
Since EA is sound and by assumption of T also being sound we have for each n
that N |= 〈n〉TrueT ⊤, we may conclude that for any number m,
N |= σ(m) ⇐⇒ N |= [n]TrueT ρn(m)
which was to be proven.
Feferman showed in [3] that for each unsolvable Turing degree d there is a
theory U so that the Turing degree of {pϕq | U ⊢ ϕ} is d. However, the theories
that Feferman considered were formulated in the language of identity and in
particular did not contain arithmetic. It is not hard to see that for theories that
do contain arithmetic we can only attain degrees that arise as Turing jumps.
Lemma 3.12. Let A ⊆ N be definable on N by α(x) with Turing degree a.
Then, the
Turing degree of {ψ | EA + {α(n) | N |= α(n)} ⊢ ψ} equals a′.
Proof. Let us denote the Turing degree of a set B by |B|. We see that
|{ψ | EA+ {α(n) | N |= α(n)} ⊢ ψ}| ≤T a
′
since a Turing machine can enumerate all oracle proofs thereby reducing prov-
ability to the halting problem. Similarly, we see that
a
′ ≤T |{ψ | EA + {α(n) | N |= α(n)} ⊢ ψ}|
since we can code Turing machine computations in arithmetic.
We thus see that the Turing degrees of theories that are defined by a minimal
amount of arithmetic (EA) together with some oracle, are entirely determined by
the Turing degree of the corresponding oracle by means of the jump operator.
By Friedberg’s jump inversion theorem ([5]) we may thus conclude that any
Turing degree above 0′ can be attained as the decision problem of a theory
containing arithmetic.
In this light, Lemma 3.11 should not come as a surprise. However, in the
lemma we have provided a natural subsequence of theories so that moreover, all
the necessary reasoning for the reductions can be formalized in EA.
Lemma 3.11 is stated entirely in terms of definability and computability but
the proof tells us actually a bit more, namely that the FGH theorem is easily
formalizable within EA.
Lemma 3.13. For any c.e. theory T we have that
EA ⊢ ∀σ∈Σn+1 ∃ ρ∈Σn+1
(
〈n〉TrueT ⊤ →
(
TrueΣn+1(σ)↔ [n+ 1]
True
T ρ
) )
.
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Proof. One can simply formalize the proof of Theorem 3.8 which is easy since
mapping the Go¨del number of a Σn+1 sentence σ to the Go¨del number of its
corresponding fixpoint ρn is elementary.
Alternatively, using Lemma 3.10 we find ρn(x) ∈ Σn+1 so that
EA ⊢ ∀x
(
ρn(x) ↔ [TrueΣn+1(x) ≤ [n]
True
T ρn(x˙)]
)
.
so that by reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 3.11 we see that
EA ⊢ 〈n〉TrueT ⊤ → ∀x
(
TrueΣn+1(x) ↔
(
[n]TrueT ρn(x˙)
) )
.
For other notions of provability we get similar generalizations of the FGH
theorem. In particular, let [n]OmegaT denote the formalization of the predicate
“provable in T using at most n nestings of the omega rule”. Following the
recursive scheme [0]OmegaT ϕ := Tϕ and,
[n+ 1]OmegaT ϕ := ∃ψ
(
∀x [n]OmegaT ψ(x˙) ∧ T (∀x ψ(x)→ ϕ)
)
we see that for c.e. theories T we can write [n]OmegaT by a Σ2n+1-formula. Also,
we have provable Σ2n+1 completeness for these predicates, that is:
Proposition 3.14. Let T be a computable theory extending EA and let φ be a
Σ2n+1 formula. We have that
EA ⊢ φ→ [n]OmegaT φ.
Proof. By an external induction on n where each inductive step requires the
application of an additional omega-rule.
This proposition is the omega-rule analogue of provable Σn+1,1 completeness
for the [n]TrueT predicate. As a corollary we get an FGH Theorem for omega-
provability.
Corollary 3.15. Let T be any sound computably enumerable theory extending
EA and let n < ω. For each σ ∈ Σ2n+1 we have that there is some ρn ∈ Σ2n+1,1
so that
PA ⊢ 〈n〉OmegaT ⊤ →
(
σ ↔ [n]OmegaT ρn
)
.
We have formulated this corollary over PA so that Σ2n+1,1 sentences are
provably equivalent to Σ2n+1 sentences using collection. Consequently, we can
now also prove a definability result for the [n]OmegaT predicate.
Lemma 3.16. Let T be any c.e. theory, let n be a natural number, and let
A ⊆ N. The following are equivalent
1. A is c.e. in ∅(2n);
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2. A is definable on the standard model by a Σ2n+1 formula;
3. A is definable on the standard model by a formula of the form [n]OmegaT ρ(x˙);
4. A is definable on the standard model by a formula of the form [n]OmegaT ρ(x˙)
where ρ(x) ∈ Σ2n+1,1;
Proof. The proof of this lemma is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.11 if one
substitutes Σn+1 by Σ2n+1, EA by PA, and [n]
True
T by [n]
Omega
T .
By comparing lemmas 3.11 and 3.16 we see that in a sense the hierarchy of
formulas of the form [n]TrueT ϕ is more fine-grained than the hierarchy of formulas
of the form [n]OmegaT ϕ.
The positive feature of the latter hierarchy is that it is defined solely in terms
of provability whereas the former needs to call upon partial truth predicates.
As such the [n]OmegaT hierarchy is more amenable to Turing jumps beyond the
finite where no clear-cut syntactical characterizations along the lines of Post’s
correspondence theorem are available (see [4]).
The down-side to the [n]OmegaT hierarchy is that it runs outline with the
Turing-jump hierarchy. In a forth-coming paper we propose a transfinite pro-
gression of provability notions in second order arithmetic that takes the best of
both worlds: it is defined purely in terms of provability as in (4), synchronizes
with the Turing-jump hierarchy as in Theorem 5.2, and can be transfinitely ex-
tended along any ordinal Ξ definable in second order logic yielding for a large
class of second order theories a sound interpretation of a well-behaved logic
called GLPΞ as in Theorem 5.4.
We end this section with some remarks on the fixpoint used in the proof of
the FGH theorem. By no means, this fixpoint is the only one that works. The
minor change where we consider ρ ↔ (σ < ρ) works with almost the same
proof. But we also have a ‘dual’ version of our fixpoint which gives the desired
result.
Lemma 3.17. Let T be a c.e. theory and let σ ∈ Σ1.
If EA ⊢ ρ ↔ (T¬ρ ≤ σ) then EA ⊢ σ ∨T⊥ ↔ T¬ρ.
Proof. We reason in EA assuming ρ ↔ (T¬ρ ≤ σ).
→: We suppose σ. If ρ, then T¬ρ ≤ σ whence T¬ρ. If ¬ρ, then
¬(T¬ρ ≤ σ). (2)
But from our assumption σ we get by the minimal number principle that σ ≤ σ
so that (T¬ρ ≤ σ)∨(σ < T¬ρ) whence by (2) we get σ < T¬ρ. By provable
Σ1-completeness we get T (σ < T¬ρ) whence T¬ρ.
←: If T¬ρ and ¬σ, then T¬ρ ≤ σ whence ρ and by Σ1 completeness Tρ
so that T⊥.
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Since this proof uses the minimal number principle, it is not amenable for
generalizations to stronger provability notions over a weak base theory. The fol-
lowing fixpoint does allow such generalizations. Note that the two lemma’s are
very similar yet not necessarily equivalent since fixpoints involving the witness-
comparison relation are in general not closed under substituting logical equiva-
lents.
Lemma 3.18. Let T be a c.e. theory and let σ ∈ Σ1.
If EA ⊢ ρ ↔ ¬(T ρ < σ) then EA ⊢ σ ∨T⊥ ↔ Tρ.
Proof. Again, we reason in EA now avoiding the minimal number principle.
→: Suppose σ. If σ ≤ Tρ, then T (σ ≤ Tρ) whence T¬(T ρ < σ) so
that ρ. If ¬(σ ≤ Tρ), then since σ we have Tρ.
←: Suppose Tρ and ¬σ. Then, Tρ < σ whence also T (Tρ < σ). Thus
T¬ρ, which together with the assumption that Tρ yields T⊥.
4 An algebraic perspective
In this section we shall recast the generalized FGH theorem in algebraic terms.
Let us fix some c.e. theory T . The generalized FGH theorem tells us that
Σn+1 sentences are almost equivalent to sentences of the form [n]
True
T φ: that
is, ∀σ ∈ Σn+1 there is ρ such that EA ⊢ σ ∨ [n]TrueT ⊥ ↔ [n]
True
T ρ. Thus,
‘almost equivalent’ refers to that we always have to take the disjunct [n]TrueT ⊥
along. This is due to the fact that [n]TrueT ⊥ is minimal among all sentences of
the form [n]TrueT φ hence we cannot find [n]
True
T φ-equivalents of Σn+1,1 sentences
below [n]TrueT ⊥.
It is well know that there are plenty of such sentences. For example, the
structure of Σ1 sentences within the Lindenbaum algebra of any consistent
c.e. theory is known to be densely ordered by the following folklore fact which
can be readily proven by an application of Rosser’s Theorem.
Fact 4.1. Let T be a c.e. theory. For any two Σ1 sentences σ0, σ2 so that
T ⊢ σ0 → σ2 but T 0 σ2 → σ0, there is some σ1 which lies strictly in between σ0
and σ2. That is, T ⊢ (σ0 → σ1)∧ (σ1 → σ2) but T 0 σ2 → σ1 and T 0 σ1 → σ0.
Proof. Since T 0 σ2 → σ0, we know that T + ¬σ0 + σ2 is consistent and will
consider the corresponding Rosser sentence ρ ∈ Σ1 as in Theorem 3.1. Now,
σ1 := σ0 ∨ (ρ ∧ σ2) will do the job: Clearly T ⊢ (σ0 → σ1) ∧ (σ1 → σ2);
also T + ¬σ0 + σ2 0 ρ implies T 0 σ2 → σ1, and T + ¬σ0 + σ2 0 ¬ρ implies
T 0 σ1 → σ0.
Before we recast the FGH theory in terms of algebras we need some addi-
tional notation. Let Σn+1,1/≡T denote the set of T -equivalence classes of Σn+1,1
sentences and likewise, let [n]TF/≡T denote the set of T -equivalence classes of
sentences of the form [n]TrueT φ. Moreover, let (Σn+1 ↾ [n]T⊥)/≡T denote the set
of T -equivalence classes of Σn+1 sentences ϕ for which T ⊢ [n]TrueT ⊥ → ϕ.
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By Corollary 3.9 we can define ∨[n] : ([n]TF × [n]TF)→ [n]TF so that
∨[n]([n]TrueT ϕ, [n]
True
T ψ) := [n]
True
T χ where T ⊢ ([n]
True
T ϕ ∨ [n]
True
T ψ)↔ [n]
True
T χ.
This map ∨[n] naturally extends to [n]F/≡T and substructures thereof. Like-
wise, we define ∧[n]([n]TrueT ϕ, [n]
True
T ψ) := [n]
True
T (ϕ ∧ ψ). With this notation the
FGH theorem can be reinterpreted in terms of algebras.
Lemma 4.2. For any c.e. theory T , the algebras
1. 〈(Σn+1 ↾ [n]T⊥)/≡T ,∧,∨, [n]T 〉;
2. 〈[n]TF/≡T ,∧[n],∨[n], [n]T 〉;
define the same subalgebra of the Lindenbaum algebra of T .
Proof. This follows directly from the above considerations. We can map σ to
[n + 1]TrueT ρn+1 as in the FGH theorem to establish a natural map on different
representations of the same equivalence class within the Lindenbaum algebra of
T .
5 Graded provability via Turing jumps
We shall now see how the FGH theorem can be used to define graded provability
notions [n]T for n ∈ N which are defined using only provability notions yet which
are Σn+1 complete very much in the same way as Lemma 3.11 told us that the
[n]TrueT predicates are Σn+1 complete. Recall that on the natural numbers we
have
[n+ 1]TrueT ϕ ⇔ ∃π
(
TrueΠn+1(π) ∧T (TrueΠn+1(π)→ φ)
)
where [0]TrueT is nothing but T . It is easy to see that this equivalence is provable
within PA. The idea now is to replace true Πn+1 sentences by consistency
statements, that is, by sentences of the form 〈n〉Tϕ. This replacement will be
done in a recursive fashion. Thus we can consider the following recursive scheme.
[0]T φ := Tφ, and [n+ 1]

T φ := Tφ ∨ ∃ψ
(
〈n〉T ψ ∧ (〈n〉

T ψ → φ)
)
. (3)
For this recursive scheme, we can easily prove various desirable properties. How-
ever, for the sake of generalizing the definition to the transfinite setting, we
choose to consider a more involved recursion.
[0]T φ := Tφ, and
[n+ 1]T φ := Tφ ∨ ∃ψ
∨
0≤m≤n
(
〈m〉T ψ ∧ (〈m〉

T ψ → φ)
)
. (4)
We shall now prove that this provability notion [n]T is actually provably very
similar to that of [n]TrueT for any natural number n.
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Proposition 5.1. Let T be a sound c.e. theory extending EA. We have for all
n ∈ N that
1. EA ⊢ ∀ϕ
(
[n]T ϕ → [n]
True
T ϕ
)
;
2. PA ⊢ 〈n〉TrueT ⊤ → ∀ϕ
(
[n+ 1]T ϕ↔ [n+ 1]
True
T ϕ
)
;
3. PA ⊢ [n]TrueT
(
∀ϕ
(
[n]T ϕ↔ [n]
True
T ϕ
) )
;
4. N |= ∀ϕ
(
[n]T ϕ↔ [n]
True
T ϕ
)
.
Proof. For the sake of readability we shall omit the subscripts T in this proof.
Item 1 : This direction is easy, since by induction on n we see that each
〈n〉T ψ is of complexity Πn+1.
Item 2: We reason in PA, assume 〈n〉True⊤ and pick ϕ arbitrary. By Item
1 we only need to prove that [n+ 1]Trueϕ→ [n+ 1]ϕ.
Thus, we suppose that [n+ 1]Trueϕ so that for some π we have TrueΠn+1(π)
and 
(
TrueΠn+1(π)→ ϕ
)
. Using the (formalized) FGH theorem we now pick ρ
so that TrueΠn+1(π)∧〈n〉
True⊤ ↔ 〈n〉Trueρ. Since we work under the assumption
of 〈n〉True⊤ we thus have 〈n〉Trueρ.
Clearly, since we know that 
(
TrueΠn+1(π) → ϕ
)
we also have the weaker

(
〈n〉Trueρ→ ϕ
)
. Thus we have 〈n〉Trueρ∧
(
〈n〉Trueρ→ ϕ
)
so that by applying
twice the induction hypothesis we get 〈n〉ρ∧
(
〈n〉ρ→ ϕ
)
and by definition
[n+ 1]ϕ as was to be shown.
Item 3: For n = 0 the statement holds by definition and for n + 1, the
statement follows from the previous item since EA ⊢ [n+ 1]True〈n〉True⊤.
Item 4: follows directly from the previous from the soundness of EA and
T .
We shall see below that [n]T provability is a very decent provability notion.
Theorem 5.2. Let T be a c.e. theory. We have for all A ⊆ N that the following
are equivalent
1. A is c.e. in ∅(n);
2. A is many-one reducible to ∅(n+1);
3. A is definable on the standard model by a formula of the form [n]T ρ(x˙).
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.11 and a minor generalization
of Proposition 5.1.
As a consequence of this theorem we see that [n]T sentences are closed under
disjunctions and conjunctions.
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Corollary 5.3. Let T be a c.e. theory extending EA and let n ∈ N. For each
formulas ϕ, ψ there is some σ so that
T ⊢ ([n]T ϕ ∨ [n]

T ψ) ↔ [n]

T σ.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 5.2 since c.e. sets (with or without oracles) are
closed under both conjunctions and disjunctions.
As a matter of fact, it turns out that this corollary can be formalized being
one of the corner stones in a proof to the extent that the provability logic
concerning the [n] predicates is nice. In particular, let GL be the normal
modal logic axiomatized by (A→ B)→ (A→ B) and (A→ A)→ A
and all propositional tautologies with rules Modus Ponens and Necessitation:
A
A
. Then GLPω is the polymodal logic axiomatized by GL for each modality
[n] together with the schemas [n]A→ [n+ 1]A and 〈n〉A→ [n+ 1]〈n〉A.
Theorem 5.4. Let T be any c.e. theory extending EA. The logic GLPω is sound
w.r.t. PA if we interpret each [n]-modality as [n]T .
The proof proceeds by a straightforward induction on n considering the logics
GLPn+1 that have only modalities up to [n].
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